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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-4103(2)0).

II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellant Daniel Van Beuge ("Appellant") asserts that the only issue on
appeal is whether the trial court correctly ruled that Appellant was a probationary
employee of Appellee Draper City (the "City") when the City terminated his
employment. See Appellant's Brief at 2-3. The City agrees that the ultimate issue
to be resolved in this appeal is whether Appellant was a probationary or permanent
employee at the time of Appellant's termination. The determination of this issue,
however, is dependent on a consideration of the following four issues:
ISSUE 1: Based on Appellant's failure to comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as his failure to dispute any of the facts
upon which the City relied in its summary judgment motion, did the trial court
correctly determine that there are no genuine issues of material fact?
ISSUE 2: Based on the undisputed facts, did the trial court correctly rule
that a clerical error in a Personnel Action Form ("PAF") did not establish that
Appellant was, in fact, a permanent, instead of a probationary, employee?
ISSUE 3: With respect to Appellant's argument that he became a
permanent employee based on the City's failure to strictly comply with its policy

for extending Appellant's probationary period, has Appellant met his burden of
proving that the policy in question is contractually binding on the City?
ISSUE 4: Even assuming, arguendo, that the policy in question was
somehow binding on the City, do the undisputed facts establish that the City
substantially complied with the policy, such that Appellant was a probationary
employee at the time he was terminated?

III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 7(c)(3)(A) and (B), Utah R. Civ. P.
Section 1010 of the Draper City Personnel Manual

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION BELOW
Appellant initiated this lawsuit by filing his Complaint on May 2, 2008. (R.

at 1). In his Complaint, Appellant alleged only a single cause of action for
declaratory judgment, wherein he asked the court to issue a declaratory order that
Appellant was a "permanent employee" of the City, not a probationary employee,
when he was terminated on March 12, 2008. (R. at 1-2). As alleged in his
Complaint, Appellant claims that the City made him a permanent employee by
means of a PAF that the City delivered to him in February 2008, which indicated
that his employment status was "Permanent." (R. at 1-2).
On November 5, 2008, Appellant filed a summary judgment motion
wherein he asked the Court to rule that he was a permanent employee of the City

as of February 11, 2008. (R. at 14). The City filed a memorandum in opposition
to Appellant's summary judgment motion on December 8, 2008. (R. at 28-42).
On March 16, 2009, the trial court denied Appellant's summary judgment motion
on the grounds that, based on the record before it,1 there were disputed issues of
fact as to whether Appellant was a permanent employee or an at-will probationary
employee when he was terminated. (R. at 46-47).
On December 11, 2009, after the parties had conducted discovery in the
case, the City filed its motion for summary judgment. (R. at 88-89). The City
filed a memorandum in support of this motion, together with numerous exhibits
and several affidavits. (R. at 91-180). In its supporting memorandum, the City
argued that the undisputed facts established: (1) that Appellant had numerous
fundamental performance problems and was the subject of repeated disciplinary
action throughout the time that he was employed by the City; (2) that Appellant
was notified on at least two occasions that his probationary status was being
extended; (3) that the indication of'"Permanent" employee status in the February
2008 PAF was simply the result of a clerical error; (4) that Appellant knew his
probation had been extended for six months; and (5) Every action the City took,
other than the clerical error in the February 2008 PAF, was consistent with the fact
that Appellant's probationary employee status had been extended, and the fact that
!

At the time Appellant filed his summary judgment motion, no discovery had
taken place in the case. After filing this lawsuit, Appellant did not schedule an
attorneys' planning meeting report for many months and did nothing to pursue his
lawsuit prior to filing his summary judgment motion. (R. at 49).
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Appellant was a probationary employee at the time the City terminated his
employment. (R. at 88-104).
Appellant filed his opposing memorandum to the City's summary judgment
motion on January 4, 2008. (R. at 283-291). In his opposing memorandum,
Appellant references an "Exhibit 1 hereof and an "Exhibit 3 hereof (R. at 284)
but no such exhibits are attached to his opposing memorandum. (R. 283-291). In
his opposing memorandum, as well as in his opening brief herein, Appellant
references, quotes and relies on Section 3020 of the Draper City Personnel Manual
(the "Manual"). (R. at 283-285; Appellant's Brief at 3, 8). Significantly, Section
3020 was never filed with the trial court, and was not attached in the Appendix to
Appellant's Brief and, as a result, is not part of the record below.
In any event, as discussed in the City's summary judgment reply
memorandum, Appellant's opposing memorandum failed to comply with Rule
7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Appellant also failed to
dispute a single fact relied upon by the City in its summary judgment motion. (R.
283-295). Appellant did offer some additional facts in opposition to the City's
summary judgment motion, but he failed to offer any citation to the record with
respect to a number of these facts, and none of the additional facts for which
citations were offered by Appellant were material. (R. 283-284, 293-294). Thus,
the City argued that all the facts on which it relied are deemed admitted pursuant
to Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 292-293).

o

On February 5, 2010, the trial court granted the City's summary judgment
motion by means of a Minute Entry, a copy of which is attached in the Addendum
hereto. (R. 306-310). In its ruling, the trial court rejected Appellant's argument
that the City's policies required that Appellant be given written notice that his
probationary period was being extended and if no such notice was provided then
Appellant became a permanent employee. (R. at 308). The trial court determined
that, ubased on the undisputed facts and the numerous uncontroverted documents
submitted by" the City, it was clear that Appellant had been provided notice that
his probationary status was being extended. (R. at 308-309). The trial court also
stated that it "is not persuaded that the single PAF, which the plaintiff relies on,
and which was clearly the result of a clerical error, provides any evidence that he
was in fact a permanent instead of a probationary employee." (R. at 309). Finally,
the trial court held "that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that
Draper is entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law." (R. at 309).
Judgment was subsequently filed in favor of the City on February 18, 2010,
and entered on February 22, 2010, and Appellant timely filed his Notice of Appeal
on March 10, 2010. 2 (R. at 317-320).

2

As a preliminary note, the City points out that Appellant's Docketing Statement,
which was filed on April 12, 2010, does not comply with Rule 9 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, because it fails: (1) to state the standard of review with
supporting authority that the Court should use in reviewing his appeal; (2) does
not set forth a statement of any of the issues Appellant intends to assert on appeal;
(3) does not give citations to determinative statutes, rules or cases; (4) does not
provide a succinct summary of facts material to a consideration of the issues
m

B.

RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant summarily asserts that there are no negative facts to marshal in

his brief because all facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to him, as the
losing party on the City's summary judgment motion. (See Appellant's Brief at
3). Appellant, however, does at least reference the following two significant facts
which do not support his position in this appeal: (1) Sergeant Chad Carpenters'
Performance Appraisal of Appellant, wherein he informed Appellant that he was
recommending that Appellant's probation be extended; and (2) the Affidavit of
Lieutenant Russell A. Adair who affirmed that he verbally informed Appellant of
the City's decision to extend Appellant's probationary status for six months. (See
Appellant's Brief at 3-4).
In his cavalier approach to the obligation to marshal the opposing evidence,
Appellant does not even acknowledge, much less discuss, either his failure to
dispute a single fact offered by the City in support of its summary judgment
motion, or his failure to comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B). These undisputed and
uncontroverted facts are central to any resolution of this appeal, and they are
summarized below.

presented; and (5) fails to attach a single document regarding final judgment, or
the rulings or findings from the trial court, even though those documents are in the
record. Based on Appellant's failure to comply with Rule 9, the City submits that
Appellant's appeal should be dismissed. See C.M.C. Cassity, Inc. v. Aird, 707
P.2d 1304, 1305 (Utah 1985).
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Appellant began working as a probationary police officer for the City on or
about October 23, 2006. (R. at 127). Pursuant to City policy, Appellant, as a
hired police officer was subject to a twelve-month probationary period. (R. at 127,
129 at1J5;). 3
In January 2007, Appellant left the City during his shift and traveled to
North Salt Lake, without first obtaining his supervisor's authorization. (R. at 133137). The City subsequently investigated the matter and found that Appellant had
violated numerous City polices and, as a result, Appellant received a verbal
warning for leaving his assigned responsibility in the City without his supervisor's
authorization, for failing to tell dispatch when he was enroute, for failing to know
his location when he arrived, and for failing to provide dispatch with his location.
(R. at 111-112, 133-137). In addition, Appellant received a written reprimand for
failing to comply with a supervisor's directive. (R. at 111-112, 133-137).
In January 2007, Appellant also received a performance evaluation which
indicated that he was a probationary employee, and which identified a number of
areas where his work performance was unsatisfactory and needed improvement.
(R. at 138-139). That same month, Appellant signed a written warning regarding
his deficient report writing, wherein his supervisor criticized Appellant for not
preparing a report when he should have and stated that there were "multiple"
reports filed by Appellant that were missing information. (R. at 140-141).
The City's Police Department has its own policies. (R. 130 at f 7). Police
officers have a longer period of probation than other City employees. (R. 130 at f
7).
1?

Appellant's job performance problems continued. In June 2007, Appellant
was copied on an email between his supervisors, which severely criticized
Appellant's deficient performance with respect to making false statements
regarding evidence and for improperly taking evidence home, and for, among
other things, writing "the worst DUI report" his supervisor had ever seen. (R. at
142-143). Appellant's supervisor also wrote that, on June 6, 2007, Appellant was
admonished (for the second time in ten days) to complete his work prior to going
off duty and that Appellant had left work without finishing a report on a domestic
violence case in which an arrest had been made. (R. at 142-143).
On July 6, 2007, and on August 21, 2007, Appellant received performance
evaluations, both of which indicated that Appellant needed to improve his work
performance, and which noted a number of specific incidents of unsatisfactory
work performance. (R. at 144-148).
In late September 2007, Appellant received yet another performance
evaluation which, in addition to showing that his employment status was
probationary, also stated that he needed to improve his work performance and it
again listed a number of specific incidents of his unsatisfactory work performance.
(R. at 149-151). Significantly, in this evaluation, Appellant was expressly
informed in writing, and orally, that although his probation was scheduled to end
in October, his supervisor, Sergeant Chad Carpenter, had recommended that his
probationary period be extended. (R. at 116, 149-151). Appellant signed and
acknowledged this performance evaluation on September 28, 2007. (R. at 149).

That same week (the week of September 23, 2007), Lieutenant Adair met
with Appellant and informed him that the City was extending Appellant's
probation for six additional months due to performance issues.4 (R. at 153, f 3).
A few days later, on October 3, 2007, Lieutenant Adair sent the City's
human resource director an email explaining that Appellant's probation was being
extended 'Tor an additional 6 months to see if we can correct his deficiencies
during this period. . . . His current sergeant is aware of the situation and is working
with him in an attempt to correct the problems." (R. at 154).
During Appellant's extended probationary period, Appellant had numerous
additional incidents of performance problems and disciplinary actions where the
City treated him as a probationary employee. On October 24, 2007, the City

4

In his brief, Appellant incorrectly asserts that this conversation actually took
place on September 23, 2007. (See Appellant's Brief at 9). To the contrary,
Lieutenant Adair only stated that it took place sometime during the week of
September 23, 2007, which means it could have taken place at any time from
September 23 to and including September 29, 2007. (R. at 152-153). Thus,
Appellant is also incorrect in asserting that the conversation with Lieutenant Adair
took place before Appellant signed the above-referenced performance evaluation
acknowledging that Sergeant Chad Carpenter had informed him of Sergeant
Carpenter's recommendation that Appellant's probationary status be extended.
(See Appellant's Brief at 9-10). While Lieutenant Adair could not pm down
exactly when during the week of September 23rd that he had his conversation with
Appellant, it only makes sense that it was after the performance evaluation, i.e.,
that Appellant's direct supervisor , Sergeant Carpenter, informed Appellant of his
recommendation to extend Appellant's probation and, shortly thereafter,
Lieutenant Adair orally informed Appellant that his probation was, in fact, being
extended for an additional six months due to Appellant's numerous performance
problems.

14

received a citizen complaint for the manner in which Appellant drove a City police
car while he was off-duty. (R. at 155-157). An investigation ensued, the
complaint was sustained, and Appellant was given a verbal reprimand. (R. at 155157). In a December 6, 2007 email to Appellant's supervisor regarding the citizen
complaint, Lieutenant Adair referenced Appellant's probationary status, by
stating: UI have not entertained the violation of Policy for driving the vehicle off
duty since that might lead to the charge of dishonesty during an IA [Internal
Affairs] investigation which would end Van Beuge's probation." (R. at 158).
On January 10, 2008, Appellant received yet another verbal warning
concerning his failure to properly complete his time card. (R. at 159; cf R. at 160161). Eight days later, on January 18, 2008, Appellant was dispatched on a
residential burglary call. Instead of responding immediately, Appellant remained
at a 7-Eleven store and continued to visit with other police officers. Appellant was
cautioned that his response time of 41 minutes was unreasonable and that further
delayed responses to calls for service could result in serious corrective action. (R.
at 121, 162).
In the meantime, on or about January 29, 2008, Hazel Dunsmore, a City
Human Resources Officer, was preparing several City PAFs. (R. at 130-132). At
that time she had been employed by the City for approximately three months. (R.
at 130-132). In preparing the PAFs, Ms. Dunsmore used a template and simply
changed the name and some of the information on the PAFs. (R. at 130-132). On
Appellant's PAF, she made a clerical error on the template and did not change the
1S

Employee Job Status from "permanent" to "probationary." (R. 130-132). She had
not checked Appellant's personnel file to determine whether his job status was
permanent or probationary and she had not been told by anyone that Appellant's
job status was permanent. (R. at 130-132). Furthermore, Ms. Dunsmore did not,
and does not, have authority to change an employee's job status from probationary
to permanent. (R. at 130-132).
When Appellant received the PAF with the clerical error, he made a copy
of the document because he was concerned the City would say he was still a
probationary employee. (R. at 119). Significantly, there is no evidence that
anyone at the Police Department or the City told Appellant that he was no longer a
probationary employee.
Appellant's work performance continued to be unsatisfactory, and that fact
was documented in a performance evaluation prepared by Appellant's supervisor
for the period of January 1, 2008 through February 29, 2008. (R. at 163-164).
Significantly, this performance evaluation also indicated that Appellant's
employment status was probationary. (R. at 163-164). Appellant's employment
was terminated by the City on March 3, 2008. (R. 165). In addition, when
Appellant was terminated, the City considered Appellant's employment status to
be probationary. (R. at 129 at % 8).
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
All of the facts relied upon by the City in its summary judgment motion are
deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(A), both because Appellant's opposition
1£

to the City's motion failed to comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B), and because he failed
to dispute any of the City's facts. Therefore, based on the record, the trial court
correctly concluded that there were no material issues of disputed fact which
would preclude the court from granting the City's motion.
In addition, the undisputed facts established that Appellant had numerous
performance problems and was the subject of repeated disciplinary action
throughout his employment with the City. As a result, the City determined to
extend Appellant's probationary status for an additional period of six months. It is
also undisputed that Appellant signed a written performance evaluation
acknowledging that his Sergeant recommended that his probationary period be
extended, and that he was informed by Lieutenant Adair that his probation was
being extended for six months based on his performance problems. The
undisputed facts further demonstrate that the City considered Appellant to be a
probationary employee throughout his employment, as reflected in its internal
communications and its subsequent performance evaluations of Appellant.
Further, it is undisputed that the February 2008 PAF, which identified Appellant
as a permanent employee, was the result of a clerical error by a person who simply
forgot to change the form on which she was working, and that she had no authority
to change the status of Appellant's employment. Finally, as the trial court
correctly determined, it is undisputed that Appellant was fully aware that he was a
probationary employee at the time he was terminated. Based on these undisputed
facts, as well as the applicable law, the clerical error in the subject PAF did not
17

change Appellant's employment status from a probationary to a permanent
employee.
In his appeal, Appellant has now abandoned his argument that the February
2008 PAF elevated him to the status of a permanent employee. Instead, he argues
that, based on the City's failure to strictly comply with Section 3020 of the
Manual in extending his probationary period, Appellant automatically became a
permanent employee. This argument fails for two reasons. First, Appellant
simply assumes that Section 3020 creates a contractually binding obligation on the
City to follow it to the letter. It is Appellant's burden, however, to establish the
existence of a contractual obligation on the part of the City, since he is the party
seeking to enforce this alleged contractual obligation. Specifically, Appellant has
failed to put an actual copy of Section 3020 of the Manual into the record, and he
has also failed to establish that the Manual does not include a disclaimer to the
effect that nothing in the Manual creates a contract. In fact, the Manual does
include such a disclaimer. As a result, the record before this Court does not
establish that Section 3020 is contractually binding on the City.
Regardless, even assuming arguendo that Section 3020 is somehow binding
on the City, the undisputed facts establish that the City meets the substantial
compliance rule articulated in Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d
1063, 1066 (Utah 1981). In other words, even if the City did not strictly comply
with Section 3020, it substantially complied with it. Here, the undisputed facts
establish that Appellant was informed on several occasions that his probationary

18

status was being extended (both in writing and orally), that it was being extended
for six months, and that it was being extended due to various performance
problems which were specifically identified in various performance evaluations
and disciplinary actions. It is also undisputed that Appellant was fully aware that
his probationary status had been extended. Thus, the purpose of Section 3020 was
satisfied and the City substantially complied with the provision such that
Appellant was, as the trial court found, a probationary employee when he was
terminated.

VI. ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THERE
ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT.
The facts asserted in the City's supporting memorandum to its summary

judgment motion were admitted as uncontroverted pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure a memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment must
"contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is
controverted." The rule also requires that, for each disputed fact, the opposing
party must provide "an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials." If the
opposing party does not controvert the movant's facts as required by Rule
7(c)(3)(B) then, pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(A), the uncontroverted facts are deemed
admitted for purposes of summary judgment.
10

Appellant failed to controvert the eighteen separately numbered paragraphs
in the City's initial summary judgment memorandum. In addition, Appellant's
opposition memorandum did not include a verbatim restatement of the City's
facts, nor did his memorandum provide a supported explanation for any grounds
of any dispute. (R. at 283 to 291). As noted, both elements are required by Rule
7(c)(3)(B). Therefore, pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(A), the eighteen, uncontroverted
fact paragraphs in the City's summary judgment memorandum are deemed
admitted and do not create a genuine issue of material fact.
In addition, though Appellant's opposing memorandum did include a
recitation of eight additional facts (as set forth in the "Undisputed Facts" section in
Appellant's opposition memorandum), four of these fact paragraphs (specifically
paragraphs 3-5 and 8) are not supported by any citations to evidence. (R. at 283,
284). Such "bare contentions, unsupported by any specifications of facts in
support thereof, raise no material questions of fact." Brigham Truck and
Implement Co. v. Fridal, 746, P.2d 1171, 1173 (Utah 1987), citing Massey v. Utah
Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937 (Utah 1980). Thus, as unsupported contentions, the
facts asserted by Appellant in said paragraphs 3-5 and 8 cannot give rise to a
genuine issue of material fact.
Moreover, paragraph 6 cites to an Exhibit that was not attached to
Appellant's opposing memorandum and is not part of the record before this Court.

Therefore, it cannot create a disputed issue of fact.5 While the remaining three
fact paragraphs 1, 2, and 7, are supported by citations to evidence, they obviously
are not material facts.6
Considering the uncontroverted, admitted facts provided by the City, and
Appellant's unsupported, immaterial, or undisputed facts, it is clear that Appellant
failed to meet his burden, in responding to the City's summary judgment motion,
that there is sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of disputed material
fact. See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2 H 17- 18, 177 P.3d 600; Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). Thus, in granting the City's summary judgment motion, the trial court
correctly concluded that there were no genuine issues of disputed material facts.
(R. at 309).
5

Regardless, even if considered, it is not material because the fact that Appellant
may have received a positive employee evaluation during his time that his
probationary period was extended does not overcome his subsequent and serious
performance problems, nor does it establish that he was no longer a probationary
employee.
6

For example, Appellant's paragraph 1 claims that his employment with the City
began on October 16, 2006. (R. at 283). Though the City asserted that his
employment began on October 23, 2006 (R. at 93), the difference in the hire date
is not material, as the trial court correctly concluded in its ruling. (R. at 306).
Similarly, the evidence that Appellant cites in support of paragraph 2 does not
support his assertion that "all" employees are required to complete a one year
probationary period; rather, it only stands for the proposition that persons hired as
City police officers are required to complete a one-year probationary period. (R at
93, 283). This is precisely consistent with the City's assertion and, therefore, there
is no dispute. Finally, the statement in paragraph 7 is not material as it simply
stands for the proposition that Appellant's employment was terminated on March
3, 2008. (R. at 284).

21

B.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE
CLERICAL ERROR IN THE SUBJECT PAF DID NOT MAKE
APPELLANT A PERMANENT EMPLOYEE.
As alleged in his Complaint, Appellant relied on the clerical error in the

February 2008 PAF as the basis for his argument that he was a permanent
employee at the time of his termination. (R. at 1-2). The trial court, however,
correctly concluded that the February 2008 PAF was insufficient to elevate
Appellant to a permanent employee, based on the undisputed facts and the
applicable law. (R. at 308-309). The undisputed facts which support the Court's
decision include the following.
First, it is undisputed that Appellant received repeated criticisms of his
work performance during the first year of his employment. (R. at 108-114, 133146). In September 2007, near the end of his first year of employment,
Appellant's supervisor, Sergeant Carpenter, recommended in writing that
Appellant's probation be extended due to work performance problems. (R. at
151). Appellant admits that he received and signed that document, and that the
extension of his probation was discussed with him. (R. at 115-116).
During the week of September 23, 2007, Appellant also met with Lieutenant
Adair and, instead of terminating his employment, Lieutenant Adair told Appellant
that his probation was being extended for six months due to work performance
issues. (R. at 153 at 13). Consistent with what was stated during that meeting,
Lieutenant Adair sent the Human Resource Department an email stating that
Appellant's probation was being extended six months and that Appellant's
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sergeant was aware of the situation and was working with Appellant to improve
his performance. (R. at 154).
The undisputed facts also establish that the City considered Appellant to be
a probationary employee because, a few months later, in an email discussing a
citizen complaint about Appellant, Lieutenant Adair referenced Appellant's
probationary status. (R. at 158). Moreover, Appellant's supervisor prepared a
performance evaluation for the period of January 1, 2008, to February 29, 2008,
which in addition to documenting that Appellant's work performance continued to
be unsatisfactory, indicated that Appellant's employment status was probationary.
(R. at 158). Also, Appellant testified that the City told him, both when he was
relieved of duty and when he was terminated, that it was because his "probation
wasn't working out." (R. at 123).
Not only did the City always consider Appellant to be a probationary
employee, the evidence shows that Appellant, himself, also knew he was a
probationary employee. For instance, Appellant testified that when he received
the February 2008 PAF with the wrong box checked (indicating he was a
permanent employee), he made a copy of the PAF because he was concerned the
City would tell him he was still a probationary employee. (R. at 119). He
admitted the reason he thought the City may tell him that he was still on probation
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was because his supervisors continued to be critical of his work performance. (R.
at 117-119).7
Finally, there is one additional fact that shows that Appellant knew he was
still a probationary employee on the date he was terminated. At the end of
February 2008, when he was told by two sergeants that he was being relieved of
duty because he failed to successfully complete his probationary period, Appellant
did not contest their assertion that he was a probationary employee. (R. at 122123).
In sum, the undisputed evidence established that: (1) throughout Appellant's
employment the City considered him to be a probationary employee; (2) Appellant
knew that his probation had been extended for six months; (3) Appellant continued
to receive criticisms and warnings about his work performance during the
extended probationary period; (4) Appellant made a copy of the PAF that showed
his status as permanent because he was concerned that the City may say that he

7

For example, his supervisor gave him a verbal warning for leaving the City
before the end of his work shift and, instead of turning around and returning to the
City, he continued home. (R. at 120, 166). Appellant also received a verbal
warning for unreasonably delaying his response to a residential burglary because
he wanted to stay and visit with other officers at a 7- Eleven store. (R. at 121,
162). His supervisor also prepared other documents identifying deficiencies in his
work performance. (R. at 167) (documenting a verbal warning for leaving his
assigned work area, (R. at 168) (documenting a verbal warning for failing to
follow policy with respect to having a driver leave his vehicle in an unsecured
location).
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was still a probationary employee. Also, it is undisputed that no one told
Appellant that he was no longer a probationary employee.
Based on the foregoing record, Appellant's assertion that he was a
permanent employee simply because there was a box marked "Permanent" on his
February 2008 PAF, is without merit. Once again, the undisputed evidence
establishes that: (1) the box was marked permanent due to an inadvertent, clerical
error; (2) the person who prepared the PAF, Ms. Dunsmore, had been employed
by the City for only three months and, when she prepared the PAF she used a
template and she made a clerical error by not changing Appellant's employee job
status box on the template she was using from "permanent" to "probationary;" (3)
Ms. Dunsmore had not checked Appellant's personnel file to determine whether
his job status was permanent or probationary and that she was not told by anyone
at the City that Appellant's job status was permanent; and (4) Ms. Dunsmore did
not have authority to change an employee's job status from probationary to
permanent. (R. at 130).
Obviously, a determination that an inadvertent clerical error is sufficient to
change an employee's employment status creates an unfortunate precedent that
would have far reaching, and undesirable consequences. The City's counsel is not
aware of a single case where a court has ruled in a manner that would support
Appellant's position here. To the contrary, courts generally do not allow a party to
benefit from inadvertent, harmless clerical errors. Cf. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a)
(providing for corrections to clerical errors in judgments). For example, in a civil
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rights action brought by Muslim inmates to allow inmates to use Muslim names,
the plaintiffs were unsuccessful, in part, because the use of an inmate's given
name, rather than Muslim name, was due to a clerical error. See Masjid
Muhammad-DDC v. Keve, 538 F.Supp.2d 720, 723 (D. Del. 2008). In another
case, the court held that a retirement plan could recover overpayments that were
made to a widow due to clerical error. See Blanck v. Consolidated Edison
Retirement, No. 02-Civ-7718, 2004 WL 115199 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2004) (R.
at 169-177). In Pipoly v. Premier Parks, Inc., a civil rights action, the court held
that a clerical error in recording an officer's commission did not preclude a finding
that the officer was acting under color of state law. No. 00-3616, 2001 WL
1006142 at * 2 (6th Cir. 2001) (R. at 178-180). Likewise, in Krutchkoffv. Fleet
Bank, 960 F.Supp. 541, 551 (D. Conn. 1996), the court held that a bank did not
waive its right to collect the actual balance of a loan (plus interest, attorney's fees
and court costs), even though, due to a clerical error, the amount owed on the loan
had been misstated in a letter by the bank. Finally, the court in Cope v.
McPherson, 594 F.Supp. 171, 176 (D. D.C. 1984), stated that the denial of a
promotion resulting from a clerical error would not establish an age discrimination
claim.
Based on the foregoing legal authority, the trial court correctly concluded
that the clerical error in the February 2008 PAF is insufficient as a matter of law to
change Appellant's employment status from probationary to permanent.
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C

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT HE BECAME A
"PERMANENT" EMPLOYEE BASED ON THE CITY'S FAILURE
TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH SECTION 3020 OF THE MANUAL
IS WITHOUT MERIT.
On appeal, Appellant has apparently abandoned his argument that he

became a permanent employee based on the February 2008 PAF. Instead,
Appellant now argues that the provisions in Section 3020 of the Manual created an
implied-in-fact-contract. Under the theory asserted in his brief, Appellant argues
that the City had to strictly comply with the language of Section 3020 if it was
going to extend Appellant's probationary status. Appellant, however, fails to meet
his burden of proof for establishing that Section 3020 gives rise to an implied-infact agreement that is contractually binding on the City. Even assuming the
existence of such an implied-in-fact contract, however, Appellant's argument fails
based on the "substantial compliance rule," pursuant to Piacitelli v. Southern Utah
State College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Utah 1981).
1.

Appellant Fails To Meet His Burden Of Establishing That
The City Is Contractually Bound To Strictly Comply
With Section 3020 Of The Manual.

The argument now asserted in Appellant's brief is based on his assertion
that a contractual obligation arises from the probation extension policy in Section
3020 of the Manual. Appellant, however, fails to carry his burden of establishing
the existence of any such contractual obligations. It is well settled that "[t]he
burden of proving the existence of a contract is on the party seeking enforcement
of it." Oberhanslyv. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1997).
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Instead of even trying to satisfy his burden on this issue, Appellant merely
assumes the existence of a contract by asserting that "employees are entitled to
rely on those rules" that "public bodies" promulgate for themselves. (Appellant's
Brief at 8). It is significant, however, that, though Appellant quotes Section 3020
in his brief, he does not cite to anything in the record for his quotation. (See id.).
That is because Appellant failed to put Section 3020 into the record. As a result,
he cannot rely on it. Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah App. 1995.
Appellant failed to carry his burden in this regard for another reason.
Under Utah law, courts can construe a municipality's personnel manuals as part of
an employment contract. See Canfiedv. Layton City, 2005 UT, ^f 16, 122 P.3d 622
(citing Piacitelli, 636 P.2d 1063, 1066); Cabaness v. Thomas et al, 2010 UT 23, %
58, 232 P.3d 486. As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Cabaness, however,
municipal employers may avoid contractual liability by including clear and
conspicuous disclaimer language in their manuals. Id. at ^f 60 n. 9. For example,
"a clear and conspicuous disclaimer, as a matter of law, prevents employee
manuals or other like material from being considered as implied-in-fact contract
terms." Id. at ^f 58 (quoting Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1003
(Utah 1999)). Thus, to the extent that the Manual contains the appropriate
disclaimer language, Section 3020 is not contractually binding on the City.
Appellant has not put the Manual into the record, therefore he has not established
that the Manual does not include the relevant disclaimer language and, as a result,
he has not proven that Section 3020 is binding on the City.

In light of the foregoing precedent that disclaimers obviate contractual
obligations, Appellant had to show initially that the Manual does not include any
such disclaimer language if he is going to prevail on his argument that Section
3020 of the Manual creates a binding obligation on the part of the City. Appellant,
however, has made no such showing here. Most importantly, Appellant cannot
make any such showing because the Manual does, in fact, include a disclaimer.
Specifically, the opening Introduction Section of the Manual expressly states as
follows: "The information contained herein and any amendments or alterations
hereto do not constitute a contract or agreement of any kind between the City and
its employees." Section 1010 of the Manual, a copy of which is attached in the
Addendum hereto.8
In sum, inasmuch as Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Manual
lacks a disclaimer, and in light of the fact that the Manual does, in fact, contain a
disclaimer, Appellant fails to carry his burden to demonstrate the existence of a
contract. Oberhansly, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386, see also Cabaness, 2010 Ut. 23, f 58.
Thus, Appellant's entire argument regarding Section 3020 fails.

Of course the City recognizes that the quoted provision from Section 1010 is also
not part of the record below. The disclaimer language of the Manual was not
previously included in the record as it was not necessary to refute the former focus
of Appellant's argument. The City only provides it now so that the Court is fully
aware of the facts in the event the Court decides to consider Section 3020 and
Appellant's argument thereto, despite the fact that Section 3020 is also not in the
record.
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2.

Assuming, Arguendo, That The Manual Gives Rise To A
Contractual Obligation, The Undisputed Facts Establish That
The City Substantially Complied With Section 3020.

Regardless, even if the Court concludes that Section 3020 is somehow
binding on the City, the undisputed facts establish that the City "substantially
complied" with Section 3020, based on Piacitelli, supra, 636 P.2d 1063, 1066
(Utah 1981). According to the probationary extension policy of section 3020:
upon the recommendation of the supervisor and approval of
Department Head and the City Manager, the Probationary
Employment Period may be extended when the original period is not
adequate for the satisfactory assessment of an employee's
performance. In such event, the employee will receive written
notification of the reason for and the length of the extension.
Relying upon the language discussing the written notification, Appellant argues
that he was never "provided Written Notice of the reason for and length of any
extension." (Appellant's Brief at 9). Appellant also claims that the written notice
of extended probation provided in Appellant's performance evaluation, (R. at 149151), does not comply according to Appellant because the reason for and the term
of the extension were provided orally. See id. Appellant also mentions a lack of
an averment that the City Manager approved of the extension. Id. Without strict
compliance with these requirements, Appellant argues his probationary status
cannot be extended, since public "employees are entitled to rely on those rules"
which public bodies set for themselves. (Appellant's Brief at 9).
In support of this argument, indeed as the only case provided in the body of
his argument, Appellant cites Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Commission 949

in

P.2d 746, 754 (Ut. App. 1997). {See Appellant's Brief at 8). Lucas, however, is a
case dealing with due process rights under the 14 Amendment arising from a
statutorily created property interest in continued employment. Appellant has not
asserted a due process claim; his only claim is one for declaratory judgment that
sounds in contract law.
The court in Lucas, however, specifically distinguishes cases where "no
property interest exists," and "the employee must rely solely upon any procedural
protections afforded by contract. .." from due process cases. Lucus, 949 P.2d
746, 752. Of course, this case is one where Appellant is relying on a contract
theory as the basis of his claim for declaratory judgment.
In any event, Piacitelli disposes of Appellant's argument. Piacitelli is
widely cited for what is referred to as the "substantial compliance rule." Zadaggar
v. Zale Corp., 856 F.2d 1473, 1477 (10th Cir. 1988). See also, Yarcheski v. Reiner,
669 N.W. 2d 487, 495 (S.D. 2003) (Supreme Court of South Dakota adopting the
rule) and Horn v. State, 459 N.W. 2d 823, 824 (N.D. 1999) (Supreme Court of
North Dakota adopting the rule). Appellant would have the Court ignore the
written recommendation to extend Appellant's probation in the performance
evaluation which he signed, (R. at 149-151), the verbal notice from Lieutenant
Adair with an explanation of the performance based reasoning and the extension
term of six months (R. at 35), as well as other important and relevant facts.
Instead, Appellant would have the Court blindly impose a requirement of strict
compliance with Section 3020, despite the undisputed fact that Appellant was
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actually and fully aware that his probationary period had been continued for a sixmonth period. Such a standard of strict compliance is simply inconsistent with the
substantial compliance rule articulated in Piacitelli.
According to the substantial compliance rale, acts in substantial compliance
are sufficient where "the purpose of the procedural requirements [is] fulfilled and
the substantial interests of the parties [are] satisfied." Piacitelli, 636 P.2d 1063,
1066. In Stensrud v. Mayville, the relevant personnel manual included regulations
of the State Board of Higher Education which required a written notice of
termination. 368 N.W. 2d 519, 522 (N.D. 1985). Citing Piacitelli, however, the
court found substantial compliance absent such a written notice after determining
that "the purpose" behind the regulation was "to ensure receipt of notice from the
responsible person." Id. Interestingly, the personnel manual in Piacitelli also
required "written warning," but the absence of such a warning did not preclude a
holding of substantial compliance. 636 P.2d 1063, 1065-66. The written
performance evaluation signed by Appellant, (R. at 149-151), the verbal notice
from Lieutenant Adair (R. at 35), among other facts, "ensure receipt of notice from
the responsible person." Stensrud, 368 N.W. 2d 519, 522.
The best explanation for the purpose behind the requirement for approval of
a superior's recommendation for probationary extension by the Department Head
and City Manager is to protect an employee's interests against unilateral decisions,
and to ensure that the employee receives notice of the extension, as well as of the
length and basis for the extension. In the present case, not only Appellant's
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supervisor, Sergeant Carpenter, but Lieutenant Adair, and the Police Chief
(Department Head) approved of the extension. (R. at 87, 129). Indeed, despite a
clerical mistake on the PAF, each of the City's interactions with Appellant are
consistent with the obvious understanding that Appellant was a probationary
employee. Moreover, the fact that Appellant continued as a probationary
employee for several months after the initial one-year probationary term suggest,
at a minimum, approval of the probationary extension by the City Manager, and
Appellant has not demonstrated otherwise. Finally, as discussed above, it is
undisputed that Appellant was aware of the extension, as well as the period of the
extension and the reasons why the probation was extended.
It is also significant that, in professions where public safety is an issue, the
determination of supervisors is given heightened deference in deciding whether
substantial compliance exists. Don Houston, M.D.y Inc. v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc., 933 P.2d 403, 405-408 (Utah App. 1997). Law enforcement is such a
profession. Thus, having satisfied the purposes and interests behind the Section
3020, the City is in substantial compliance even assuming the existence of a
contractual obligation that Appellant has neither established nor proven.

VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the City respectfully submits that the trial court's
decision to grant the City's summary judgment motion against Appellant should
be affirmed.
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DATED this 20^h
day of September, 2010.

PRESTON & SCOTT

Stanley J. Prestc
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ADDENDUM
February 5,2010 Third District Court Minute Entry Granting
Summary Judgment to Appellee Draper City

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL VAN BEUGE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:

CASE NO. 080907344

:

DRAPER CITY, a body politic,
Defendant.

The Court has before

:
:

it a request

for decision filed by the

defendant seeking a ruling on its Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court
notes that the parties have requested oral argument on the defendant's
Motion.

However, since the parties' written submissions adequately

apprise the Court of their respective legal positions, the Court declines
to schedule this matter for hearing and will instead rule as stated
herein.
As factual background, the plaintiff in this case began working for
defendant Draper City ("Draper") as a police officer in October of 2006.2
The plaintiff was subsequently terminated from his employment.

The

plaintiff's Complaint seeks declaratory judgment that at the time of his
termination, he had progressed from probationary employment status to a
permanent employee entitled to a pre-termination hearing.

1

dispute.

While the precise date of employment is in dispute, this does not constitute a material
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Along with its Motion for Summary Judgment, Draper has submitted the
Affidavit of Mac Connole who is the Police Chief for Draper.
Connole attests that

u

Chief

[p] ersons who are hired as police officers with the

City of Draper are in a probationary status for one year."
Affidavit at para. 5) .

(Connole

He further attests that the plaintiff had been

informed that due to ujob performance issues, his probationary status was
being extended an additional six months."

(Connole Affidavit at para.

6)
Draper has also submitted the Affidavit of Russell L, Adair, a
Lieutenant in the City of Draper Police Department.
attests that he met with the plaintiff

u

Lieutenant Adair

[d] uring the week of September

23, 2007, " and informed him that ndue to performance issues the City was
extending his probation an additional six months."

(Adair Affidavit at

para. 3 ) .
Attached as Exhibit M to the plaintiff's Supporting Memorandum is
an

email

from

Lieutenant

Adair

to

the

Human

Resources

Department

discussing the extension of the plaintiff's probationary status.

Also

attached, as Exhibit K, is a Performance Evaluation Report, indicating
that the plaintiff's probationary status was scheduled to end in October,
but recommending an extension of the probationary period.
and his supervising officer both signed this Report.

The plaintiff

A number of other

Exhibits attached to the Supporting Memorandum further reference the
plaintiff's continuing status as a probationary employee.
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It appears that in February of 2008, a Human Resources Officer named
Hazel Dunsmore prepared a Personal Action Form
salary

change

for

the plaintiff.

("PAF") to approve a

Ms. Dunsmore

has

submitted

her

Affidavit, attesting that in preparing the PAF from a template she "made
a

clerical

error

and did not change the Employee

Permanent to Probationary."

Job Status from

(Dunsmore Affidavit at para. 4 ) .

Dunsmore further attests that she "had not checked

Ms.

[the plaintiff's]

personnel file to determine whether his job status was Permanent or
Probationary."

Id.

In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Draper argues that it considered
the plaintiff

to

be

a probationary

employee

at

the

time

of

his

termination and that Ms. Dunsmore7s clerical error in preparing the PAF
did not result in an actual change of the plaintiff's employment status
from probationary to permanent.
In Opposition, che plaintiff maintains that Draper's own internal

policies and procedures mandated that he be provided written notice of
his probationary status being extended. The plaintiff argues that in the
absence of such notice, this Court

u

must hold that plaintiff became a

full time non-probationary employee" and was therefore entitled to a pretermination hearing with right to appeal.
After considering the parties' positions, the Court determines that
based on the"undisputed facts and the numerous uncontroverted documents
submitted by,Draper, the plaintiff was clearly made aware and provided
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notice of his superior's intent to extend his probationary status because
of concerns with his job performance.

This intent was conveyed to the

Human Resources Department and was reflected in a performance evaluation
which the plaintiff acknowledged by signing.
Further, the Court is not persuaded that the single PAF, which the
plaintiff relies on, and which was clearly the result of a clerical
error, provides any evidence that he was in fact a permanent instead of
probationary employee. Indeed, there is no dispute that Ms. Dunsmore had
no authority to change the plaintiff's job status, that she was merely
working from a template and that she had not checked the personnel file
to verify that in fact his status was that of a probationary employee.
The Court agrees that it would be inequitable and unlawful for the
plaintiff to elevate his employment
inadvertent error.

status based on Ms. Dunsmore's

The legal authorities cited by Draper in its moving

papers support this conclusion.
Accordingly, the Court determines that there are no genuine issues
of material fact and that Draper is entitled to Summary Judgment as a
matter of law.
Judgment.

The Court therefore grants Draper's Motion for Summary
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This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court.
Dated this

y

day of February, 2010.

fi

WILLIAM W. BARRETT}
\
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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HAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this_
2010:

Jerrald D. Conder
Attorney for Plaintiff
341 S. Main Street, Suite 406
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Stanley J. Preston
Maralyn M. English
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000

_day of February,

Rules 7(c)(3)(A) and (B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

Utah R. of Civ. Proc. 7(c)(3)(A):
A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue
exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to
relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the
moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
unless controverted by the responding party.

UtahR. of Civ. Proc. 7(c)(3)(B):
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a
verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may
contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving
party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the
grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or
discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum,
each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to
supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials.

Section 1010 of the Draper City Personnel Manual

CHAPTER 1000 INTRODUCTION
Section 1010 - INTRODUCTION TO THE MANUAL
General Policy Statement:
Our employees are our most valuable resource. Therefore, this manual was written to provide a framework to guide Department
Heads' actions and to inform employees of their rights and responsibilities.
Guidelines:
1.

Purpose of the Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual. The manual is the City's guide and general summary of Human
Resource policies. Through the manual we hope to provide an understanding of City philosophy and interests, promote
consistency and fairness in employee/employer relationships, enhance employee performance, and protect City legal interests.

2.

General Guidelines. The manual contains general information and guidelines. It is not intended to be comprehensive or to deal
with all possible applications and detailed specifics of City policies and procedures. Some policies outlined here (such as Benefit
and Retirement Plans) are described in other official documents not included in this manual. These documents are controlling and
should be reviewed when specific questions arise.

3.

City's Right to Modify or Discontinue Policies. Our business environment changes frequently and quickly. The City reserves the
right to unilaterally alter, amend, except or revoke any policy, practice or procedure set forth herein in its sole discretion. All
amendments shall be adopted by resolution of the City Council.

4.

Department Head Responsibilities. It is important that Department Heads review the manual, become familiar with its policies, ask
questions, and utilize it as may be appropriate. Our goal is that these policies will promote sound management practices and the
success of each member of our organization. This manual is Draper City property and is intended for use as a reference inside our
organization.

5.

Employees' Acknowledgment. All City employees are responsible to be aware of and adhere to all the provisions of this manual
and the policies and procedures set forth herein and any amendments hereto. Each employee shall sign and submit to the City an
Acknowledgment Form, as provided by the City, attesting to the fact that he or she has had an opportunity to read and understand
the provisions set forth herein. The copy of the Personnel Manual shall be available in each Department and on the City's Network
System.

6.

Disclaimer. The information contained herein and any amendments or alterations hereto do not constitute a contract or agreement
of any kind between the City and its employees. No person other than the City Manager, with the advice and consent of the City
Council, shall enter into an employment agreement with any person inconsistent with the provisions herein. The information and
policies contained herein shall not constitute or create any rights in or obligations to any persons or parties other than to the City
and its employees. Nothing herein shall be construed to limit the City's right to discharge an employee or to create any other
obligation or liability on the City.

7

Citv Mananer Delenation Authority. Except as otherwise renuired by law or as directed by the City Council the City Manaqer shall
perform the administrative duties and responsibilities of the City regarding personnel matters and the administration of the policies
contained herein. Except in the case of appointments, hiring, promotions, transfers, reclassifications, suspensions or dismissals,
the City Manager may delegate such administrative duties and responsibilities to Department Heads or other designees as deemed
appropriate and permitted by law.
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